P T SHIPALE
I. PROLOGUE
For the seventh time this year, SADC will commemorate the Southern Africa Liberation Day which marked the end to one of the fiercest battles at Cuito Cuanavale in Southern Angola, on 23rd March 1988. The historic and decisive battle of Cuito Cuanavale, where the combined FAPLA Forces of Angola together with the Cuban Internationalist Forces and the Combatants of the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), SWAPO’s Military Wing, inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy forces and forced the apartheid regime to the negotiation table on 19th March 1989.
This led to the signing of the cease-fire agreement with apartheid South Africa and resulted in the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 435 in 1989 and a negotiated settlement for a democratic majority rule in South Africa. It was therefore recommended that the day be commemorated in honour of the Late Founding President and Father of the Namibian Nation, H.E. Dr Sam Shafiishuna Nujoma, for his contribution to our country’s independence, freedom and justice, including through the battle of Cuito Cuanavale.
II – THE PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF CUITO CUANAVALE
Indeed, when World War I started, the South African army invaded Namibia, which was a German colony at the time. After Germany was defeated in World War I, its colonies were divided among the victors. South Africa got Namibia, and it became an important member of the “white Commonwealth.” It ruled Namibia as the de facto fifth province of South Africa and exploited it economically. Since South Africa governed Namibia (South West Africa) under the League of Nations Mandate System, this precipitated a dispute over the international status of the territory when it refused to place it under the International Trusteeship System of the United Nations, following the demise of the League in 1946.
South Africa’s rule in Namibia was not challenged until the mid-1960s. Ethiopia and Liberia first challenged the right of South Africa to continue occupying Namibia under the League of Nations. South Africa responded that the League of Nations no longer existed and it still had a mandate to remain. There was really no pressure placed on South Africa at that time. In 1966, the United Nations decided that Namibia would be its direct responsibility. But South Africa refused to withdraw and hand over administration of the territory.
Pressure began to be placed on South Africa in the 1970s. First, the International Court of Justice said that South Africa’s rule over Namibia was illegal. Then, more importantly, armed struggle began in Angola. The Angolan territory between the Cuban defensive line and the Namibian border became a free-fire zone, and the South Africans shot at whatever they saw.
South Africans wanted a political solution that would allow them to retain power. They created a party in Namibia: the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. This party would work with the South African colonial authority to create an “internal solution” — elections controlled by South Africa — and give this party and allied minor parties a majority in an assembly.
By use or threatened use of veto power, Western permanent members of the United Nations Security Council persistently frustrated attempts to impose sanctions on South Africa to force it to pull out of Namibia. However, in 1977 the United States, Britain, France, West Germany and Canada (the “Contact Group”), initiated moves to broker an internationally accepted settlement of the dispute.
Their efforts led to the passing of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 in 1978, which contained the blueprint for Namibia’s transition to independence. Both the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), the leading nationalist movement which had carried out armed struggle, and South Africa accepted the resolution with some reservations. By the time Ronald Reagan became president of the United States in January 1981 virtually all outstanding issues had been resolved and the stage was set for Namibia’s transition to independence to begin.
Reagan introduced the concept of linkage: South Africa would implement UN Resolution 435 to make Namibia independent in exchange for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. South Africa claimed to support linkage. But South Africa also made it clear to the Reagan administration that they would never accept any outcome that led to SWAPO winning power in Namibia, and they were unwilling to end their support for Savimbi in Angola.
The FAPLA made a mistake in 1985 when they went offensive in the southeast: the South Africans intervened. But then they launched another offensive in 1987. It is true that, to South Africa’s dismay, the FAPLA was defeating Savimbi without South African intervention. But as the Cubans had foreseen, the South Africans intervened with their air force and special troops, turning the situation.
After these major Soviet-inspired debacles, Cuba developed an audacious plan to mobilize all of its military might, gain air superiority over the South African Defence Force, then push the defensive line south until they pushed South Africa across the border into Namibia. But the Soviets pushed Angolans to launch one more assault on the South, which once again led to disaster: the SADF pushed the FAPLA back to Cuito Cuanavale, a town that South Africa was then poised to take. This was the decisive moment that pushed Cuba to finally take action with or without Soviet support.
III– THE BATTLE FOR CUITO CUANAVALE
In the final period of the liberation struggle Founding President Sam Nujoma undertook one of the major diplomatic journeys to keep the world-wide support to SWAPO as solid as it had become. His journey started in March 1987. In April 1987, Founding President Sam Nujoma and the SWAPO delegation arrived in Cuba. Together with the Late Comrade Moses //Garoeb and Peter Tsheehama, who was SWAPO’s Representative in Havana, Cuba, Founding President met with General Raúl Castro, the then Minister of Defence of the Revolutionary Forces of the Republic of Cuba and went into a six-hour meeting chair by General Raúl Castro Ruz.
It was in that meeting that the Founding President informed General Raúl Castro Ruz that it was extremely urgent for the Cuban government to reinforce its internationalist forces on the ground in Angola, and especially to provide them with effective air cover. He predicted that once Botha was forced to fall back militarily he will collapsed politically and everything will be altered. President Fidel Castro then agreed and approved SWAPO’s proposal to reinforce Cuban internationalist forces in Angola, including bringing in the MiG 23 jet-fighters.
On November 15, 1987, Fidel held a famous meeting in Havana with his top advisors. For the first time, the Cubans were going to plan without the nightmare of a US attack on Cuba. Fidel said that the war was no longer in Cuba — it was in Angola. Reagan was defanged. The Iran-Contra is a case study in impunity for lawbreaking American imperialists, but a small measure of justice came from it.
It is against this background that on 16 November 1987, the Cuban Central Committee made the decision to reinforce its troops in Angola to counter a massive new South African commitment of infrastructure and logistics in northern Namibia, begun in March in preparation for the most ambitious offensive since 1975.
Within three months, new airports at Kahama, Matala and Xangongo where built by Cuban engineers and specialist to provide the Cuban internationalist forces, FAPLA forces and the Combatants of the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), SWAPO’s Military Wing, with effective air cover and superior dogfight capabilities against Botha’s war planes.
Cuba landed the first 15 000 reinforcements and their best pilots on 15 November 1987 in Angola. The best Cuban combat units were selected to respond to the situation. In addition, a group of advisors, officials, and cadres were flown to Cuito Cuanavale. Artillerymen, tank forces, and technicians joined them. This group of about 200 Cubans was later joined by artillery, tank and infantry units to secure Cuito Cuanavale. The Cuban-Angolan strategy was not merely to stop the SADF at Cuito Cuanavale, but also to lure the SADF into concentrating enough forces so that Cuba could advance and attack in south-western Angola.
Sufficient forces were gathered to threaten places of strategic importance to South Africa in territory chosen by Cuban and MPLA commanders. The principle was that decisive battles should take place in territory selected by Cuba and that the SADF had to be struck at its weak points, in areas of strategic importance. Cuba preferred a political solution, but if it had no alternative, was willing to strike the South Africans with all its power (Castro 1988:8).
On 25 November 1987, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to condemn the South African intervention, and demanded that South Africa unconditionally withdrew its forces by 20 December. On 5 December, General Geldenhuys announced the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola to be completed by Christmas 1987 (Jaster 1990:19). Although the USA voted for the resolution, it was stated that the US government was seeking a settlement that involved the removal of all foreign forces from the region (USA 1989:29).
In the meantime the first three hundred Cuban reinforcements began arriving in Cuito Cuanavale in early December 1987, followed by a Cuban infantry regiment and a tank company from Menongue (Crocker 1992:366). On 10 December, the Angolan government announced that it had authorised Cuba to engage the SADF (Jaster 1990:19).
On 13 December 1987, a new operation, Operation HOOPER, was launched by the SADF. According to the operational instruction for Operation HOOPER, the General Officer Commanding the forces of the SA Army in SWA had to destroy the FAPLA forces east of the Cuito River by 31 December 1987 (Heitman 1990:189).
Subsequently, from 14 December onwards, the SADF concentrated on air attacks and artillery bombardments. By 24 December, the bridge over the Cuito had been so weakened by shelling and air attacks that it had to be closed to vehicles. However, the bridge was functioning again by 27 December 1987. On 3 January, it was further damaged by a South African air-delivered “smart bomb” (Heitman 1990:198).
On 2 January 1988, an attempt was made at the Cuito front to drive 21 Brigade from its position by delivering maximum firepower. This second effort failed as well and it became clear that a third deliberate attack would be needed to destroy 21 Brigade (Heitman 1990:197). According to Fidel Castro (Barber 1989:40), the number of Cuban troops in Angola was not sufficient to defend a line that was 700 km long, and in addition to advance through 200 km of woods from Menongue to Cuito Cuanavale. It was difficult to get supplies to Cuito Cuanavale from Menongue. Therefore, it was imperative to reinforce the troops and apply an adequate concept of operations.
The Cuban government therefore decided on reinforcements to prevent both the annihilation of Angolan troops as well as the development of the “complicated situation” that could result for Cuba. Cuba was in no way responsible for the previous errors made by the Soviet Union and FAPLA that led to the situation, but could not allow “a military and political disaster to take place”. It was decided to send the most experienced pilots of the Cuban air force to Angola to conduct air strikes from the Menongue air base against South African troops at Cuito Cuanavale. Cuban commanders took charge and quickly ordered the defensive line, comprising 59 Brigade, 25 Brigade and 21 Brigade, to shorten so that it could be covered by artillery positioned west of the Cuito River.
On 4 January, it became known that the Cuban 50 Brigade was deploying to Cunene Province in south-western Angola (Heitman 1990:199). At that stage, SADF units operated east of the Cunene River as far as 10 km from Cuvelai against SWAPO. Counter-insurgency operations also continued in Ovamboland on the northern border of the then South West Africa (RSA 1988a).
It was at this point that Castro used his now famous boxing analogy to explain the carefully formulated strategy: Cuito Cuanavale in the east represented the boxer’s defensive left fist that blocks the blow, while in the west the powerful right fist had struck, placing the SADF in a perilous position (Gleijesis 2006).
On 13 January 1988, a third South African attack on 21 Brigade was launched. After the attack, 4 South African Infantry Battalion and 61 Mechanised Brigade withdrew to the east of the Chambinga high ground. They failed, however, to annihilate 21 Brigade and most of the brigade personnel escaped to the Tumpo triangle to reorganise (Heitman 1990:213).
By then it became clear that the military conflict had the potential to alter the military strategic situation in eastern and south-eastern Angola. FAPLA had not only been unable to defeat UNITA, but FAPLA positions in south-eastern Angola were in danger. The capture of Cuito Cuanavale by the SADF could force the FAPLA line of defence back to Menongue, with the Angolan government losing territory it had taken years to gain. It would have linked SADF operations in Cuando-Cubango Province and Cunene Province and SWAPO targets would have been outflanked from the east and north-east (USA 1987).
Negotiations on 28 and 29 January 1988 in Luanda, between Dr Crocker and Angolan representatives, resulted in an agreement by Angola and Cuba about the total withdrawal of Cuban troops in Angola as part of a Southern African peace settlement (USA 1989:40). On 25 February 1988, South African forces attacked FAPLA positions south of the Tumpo River and at Dala to pin down FAPLA in the area. According to SADF commanders involved, the attack on Tumpo failed because of the tactical ability of the Cubans.
Two further attacks on Tumpo (on 29 February and 23 March) again failed because of effective defence by Cuban forces (Heitman 1990:253). This final battle at Tumpo, proved to be detrimental to the morale of the SADF. The troops had fought too many fights and there was no indication of relief. The SADF lacked the offensive means and the killer instinct. The SADF suffered more losses of equipment and personnel than usual and had no substantial reserves available to continue the fight.
Aircrew members, both in helicopters and fighters, were exhausted by the numerous operations. The offensive was then stopped owing to considerations such as the cost-effectiveness of the operation (RSA 1989a). The SADF was also under pressure from President Botha to terminate the intervention because he did not want “another Vietnam”. The Battle for Cuito Cuanavale was effectively over. The SADF could not capture Cuito Cuanavale and simultaneously fight the Cuban forces in Cunene Province without unacceptable loss of life and high costs. The Soviet Union and Cuba, together with Angola and SWAPO, agreed with the USA that the military conflict had to end in the interest of broader world peace. It was therefore futile for anybody to continue the war on this level. The time had come to employ the diplomatic and political options towards a peaceful solution, despite the risk of a continued low-scale guerrilla conflict in both Angola and Namibia.
So South Africans had to agree to abandon Savimbi and allow free elections in Namibia. There was nothing South Africans could do. These elections would not have taken place without the Cuban victory in Angola.Between 7 and 11 November 1989, 670 000 Namibians cast their ballots for the election of a Constituent Assembly. SWAPO won more than 57 per cent of the vote, enough to win 41 of the 72 seats in the Assembly, but well below the critical two-thirds majority. Even though SWAPO was deprived of a two-thirds majority, other political parties did not get significant support either. The four northern districts, bordering Angola (Ovambo, Kavango, Kaokoland and the Caprivi) accounted for about 95 per cent of the vote for SWAPO (Esterhuyzen 1990:72).
IV. EPILOGUE
The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale during 1987 and 1988 was one of the final and most significant battles of the Cold War. The battle permanently changed the political and strategic landscape of the Southern African region. The peace negotiations that followed in the wake of this battle led to the withdrawal of the South African military from Angola and Namibia, resulting in the independence of Namibia and a negotiated settlement in South Africa.The victory at Cuito Cuanavale was the symbol of the whole campaign in southern Angola. Cuba helped liberate southern Africa against the United States and challenged the Soviet Union. In Africa, there is a tendency to try to court [nations] that are stronger. For instance, in 2008 for the anniversary for Cuito Cuanavale, the president of Angola made a speech about the negotiations between South Africa and Angola with the mediation of the United States, and he completely overlooked Cuba. There is also a tendency in Africa to rewrite history because the United States is so powerful. But people are still grateful as they remember and appreciate the role of Cuba. If Namibia is celebrating the 35th Independence Anniversary and we are making history in swearing-in the first female elected President in the SADC region, it is thanks to the role the Cubans have played in the historic battle of Cuito Cuanavale, together with the FAPLA forces and the combatants of PLAN. Disclaimer: The opinions expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of my employer and this newspaper but solely my personal views as a citizen.
